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Abstract. We propose a novel attack tree model, called a subjective
attack tree, aiming to address the limitations of traditional attack trees,
which use precise values for likelihoods of security events. In many situ-
ations, it is often difficult to elicit accurate probabilities due to lack of
knowledge, or insufficient historical data, making the evaluation of risk in
existing approaches unreliable. In this paper, we consider the modelling
of uncertainty about probabilities, via subjective opinions, resulting in
a model taking second-order uncertainty into account. We propose an
approach to derive subjective opinions about security events based on
two main criteria, namely a vulnerability level and technical difficulty to
conduct an attack, using subjective logic. These subjective opinions are
then used as input parameters in the proposed model. The propagation
method of subjective opinions is also discussed. Our approach is evalu-
ated against traditional attack trees using the Stuxnet self-installation
scenario. Our results show that taking uncertainty about probabilities
into account during security risk analysis can lead to different outcomes,
and therefore different security decisions.
Keywords: Attack trees · Risk analysis · Subjective logic.
1 Introduction
Attack trees (ATs) [19] have been widely used in recent years as an effective
model to analyze security of systems against potential cyber-attacks. One im-
portant parameter in ATs used to analyse security risk is the likelihood of suc-
cessful attacks (in literature, also referred to as security events). However, several
probabilistic ATs [2, 5, 12, 16, 17, 20] use precise values for likelihoods using the
probabilistic approach. In many situations, it is difficult to elicit accurate prob-
abilities due to lack of knowledge, or insufficient historical data, making the
evaluation of risk in existing approaches unreliable.
Furthermore, the determination of likelihoods in ATs is not based on a solid
foundation based on specific criteria, but rather on a direct assignment of values
to ATs leaves. To address this weakness, Abdo [1] proposed the modelling of ad-
ditional information about security events, e.g., vulnerability information, and
that the successful occurrence of attacks is evaluated according to two criteria,
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namely a vulnerability level (i.e., how easy or hard is to exploit a vulnerability)
and technical difficulty to conduct an attack, described by two qualitative scales
(see Fig 1) as follows: easy (E) , medium (M), and hard (H), for the vulnerabil-
ity level, and trivial (T), moderate (M), difficult (D), and very difficult (VD),
for the technical difficulty (a detailed description of these two scales can be
found in [1]). The final output, representing likelihoods of security input events,
is then obtained from combining the qualitative expressions of the two criteria
in a form of a matrix as depicted in Fig 1. The work, however, has two major
problems. First, it provides only a qualitative evaluation of ATs, and is therefore
not suitable for effective decision-making that requires numerical values to make
sound decisions. Second, the determination of a vulnerability level and technical
difficulty of an attack in a precise manner is often difficult. With continuous
emergence of new vulnerabilities— the so called zero-day vulnerabilities— secu-
rity analysts might be unable to give precise evaluations about their risk levels.
In addition, attackers nowadays may have the skills that enable them to conduct
cyber-attacks successfully (or discover new attack strategies) even in presence
of protected devices and networks with various security technologies. Therefore,
it’s difficult to precisely evaluate the level of technical difficulty to conduct an
attack. Based on such reasons, it is essential to find a way that allows for the
modelling of uncertainty about the values (i.e., the levels) of the two criteria.
In this paper, we address the current limitations of ATs by allowing for
uncertainty modelling about likelihoods, via subjective opinions. In Subjective
Logic [9], a subjective opinion represents the probability distribution of a ran-
dom variable complemented by an uncertainty degree about the distribution.
Our approach results in a model taking second-order uncertainty, i.e., uncer-
tainty about probabilities, into account. We refer to such an AT model as a
Subjective Attack Tree, abbreviated SAT. We use the evaluation matrix in Fig 1
as one possible way to derive subjective opinions about security events in ab-
sence of knowledge or evidence about the evaluation of the two criteria of a
vulnerability level and technical difficulty of an attack. Hence, the SAT model
(the abstract model in Section 3 and propagation method in Section 5) can be
used independently from the evaluation methodology we propose in Section 4 if
security analysts prefer to directly assign opinions to the leaves, or if they wish
to consider different evaluation methodologies. In comparison to ATs, the SAT
model adds a bit more complexity in that it allows also to propagate uncertainty
values so that uncertainty about likelihoods of the top events (i.e., root nodes)
is also computed.
Explicitly modelling uncertainty degrees about the input parameters in ATs
is important as this may lead to different outcomes, e.g., different attack paths
prioritization, different enforced sets of countermeasures, different decisions.
Apart from such importance, explicitly taking uncertainty about probabilities
into account offers a more flexible approach to decision-making process based on
factors such as organisations’ financial capabilities (budget), risk attitudes, etc.
Suppose for example a security analyst is completely uncertain about whether
an attacker can successfully conduct an attack. In contrast to guessing single
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probabilities (in absence of knowledge/evidence), our approach allows, for in-
stance, risk-averse security managers to consider the worst-case scenario (pes-
simistic view) and make decisions so as to protect the system. Others who are
risk-seeking, especially those with limited budget, may consider the best-case
scenario (optimistic view), and therefore will not need to spend more to protect
systems. Decision-making in traditional probabilistic approach leads always to
applying strict single decisions under all circumstances.
This work makes the following major contributions. (1) we develop a new
model of ATs, called SAT, that takes second-order uncertainty into account. (2)
we propose a methodology to derive opinions about security events based on the
two criteria discussed in [1] using Subjective Logic. (3) we conduct an experimen-
tal evaluation that compares our approach with traditional ATs, demonstrating
that the results differ and would lead to different decisions being made.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview
of attack trees and discuss some related work. In Section 3, we give an overview
of Subjective Logic. In Section 4, we discuss our SAT model, followed by an
approach, in Section 5, to evaluate likelihoods of security events using Subjective
Logic. In Section 6, we discuss the propagation method of subjective opinions
in SATs. In Section 7, we evaluate our approach against traditional ATs, using
the Stuxnet attack tree example. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude the paper,
discussing prospects for future work.
Fig. 1: The evaluation matrix of security events as proposed in [1].
2 Attack Trees and Related Work
An attack tree (AT) was first introduced in 1999 by Schneier [19] as a tool to
analyse and evaluate all possible attack scenarios against complex systems in a
structured, hierarchical way. The general idea of ATs is to identify one or more
attack goals against a system and then break down each goal into sub-goals (or
sub-attacks), which in turn can be further broken down into other sub-goals,
until reaching a state where sub-attacks cannot be further refined. These final
sub-attacks, representing the leaves of an AT, are the basic security events (or
action) an attacker can perform, by exploiting existing vulnerabilities, to achieve
their overall goal, i.e., the root node of an AT. A refinement from the root node
to the leaves can be either conjunctive (via AND node) or disjunctive (via OR
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node). With AND node, all children nodes must be satisfied to complete an
attack, while with OR node, at least one of the children nodes has to be satisfied.
The values of nodes in a tree can be of different forms, depending on the
security attributes or properties need to be analysed. Such values may represent
the probability of success of a given attack, the likelihood that an attacker will
try a given attack, the impact of an attack, and so on. Earlier works in this
field considered attack trees using only one estimated parameter, such as attack
probability, cost or feasibility of the attack, skill level required, etc. [13, 14, 19].
Opel [15] considered multi-parameter attack trees (attack trees that study several
security attributes of interest), but the actual tree computations in their model
still use only one input parameter at a time.
An advanced step towards better understanding the attacker’s motivation
was made in [3]. The authors considered a multi-parameter attack tree where
security properties of interest need to be analysed represent, for examples, gain of
the attacker, probability of success, probability of getting caught, and expected
penalties.
The above models of ATs have a significant drawback when they come to
practical application. The input parameters considered to be precise point esti-
mates based on the probabilistic approach. In [10], the authors addressed this
point by suggesting the use of interval values to estimate the input parame-
ters rather than single values. Their approach was basically intended to handle
the estimation problem in the multi-parameter AT approach of [3]. While inter-
val values may be a useful method to model the uncertainty about some input
parameters, e.g., cost, expected penalties, they are still incapable to model ig-
norance of or complete uncertainty about likelihoods evaluations of attacks. In
addition, specifying lower and upper bounds do not resolve the issue on how
these values were precisely determined.
A fuzzy logic approach was employed to model uncertainty in ATs [4]. The
approach is based on defining a set of qualitative expressions of likelihoods (e.g.,
very low, low, high) that describe various levels of likelihoods, and then uses fuzzy
numbers to represents experts’ judgments on them. The fuzzy logic approach is
suitable for applications that involve fuzzy sets, and when there is some difficulty
in determining the exact set that a given value should belong to. However, the
approach does not model well situations when there is, for instance, a complete
uncertainty about the evaluations.
A Bayesian network approach for ATs is explored in [8]. The authors pro-
posed a methodology that translates ATs into Bayesian Networks. The proposed
approach can deal with different ATs extensions, and allows the quantitative
evaluation of combined attacks modelled as a set of ATs. The Bayesian network
approach considers the conditional relations between the nodes, and does not
say anything about the values of the leaves (i.e., it employs also the probabilistic
approach to assign precise values to the security events).
Our approach differs from all above in that it runs under second-order un-
certainty (i.e., uncertainty about probability values) using subjective logic. This
allows to better model situations when there is high (or even complete) uncer-
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tainty about exact values. Furthermore, subjective logic offers a methodology
that easily allows to establish opinions from verbal categories because people
often find it difficult to express opinions as numerical values— qualitative verbal
categories are intuitively easier [9].
3 Subjective Logic
Subjective logic [9] is a formalism for reasoning under uncertainty that ex-
tends probabilistic logic by allowing also for uncertainty degrees to be expressed
about probability values. While the idea of probabilistic logic is to combine the
strengths of probability calculus and logic, the idea of Subjective Logic is to
model uncertainty about the probabilities themselves, making itself a useful tool
to reason with argument models in presence of uncertain or incomplete evidence.
Subjective Logic is based on Dempster-Shafer (also called evidence) the-
ory [7], and thus operates on a frame of discernment, denoted by Θ, represent-
ing the set of possible system states, referred to as atomic, or primitive, system
states, only one of which represents the actual system state.
In many scenarios, it is often difficult to determine the actual system state,
and it thus makes sense to define non-atomic (or non-primitive) states, consisting
of the union of a number of primitive states. The powerset of Θ, denoted by 2Θ,
consists of all possible unions of primitive states. A non-primitive state may
contain other states within it. These are referred to as substates of the state.
Definition 1. (Belief Mass Assignment) Given a frame of discernment Θ, we
can associate a belief mass assignment mΘ(x) with each substate x ∈ 2Θ such
that mΘ(x) ≥ 0, mΘ(∅) = 0, and
∑
x∈2Θ mΘ(x) = 1. For a substate x, mΘ(x)
is its belief mass.
Subjective logic operates on a 3-dimensional metric called opinion. Three
classes (types) of opinions are defined, namely binomial opinions, multinomial
opinions, and hyper opinions. In this paper, we deal only with binomial opinions.
Definition 2. (Binomial opinion) Let X = {x, x̄} be a state space containing x
and its complement x̄. A binomial opinion about the truth of state x is the tuple
ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉, where bx is the belief mass in support of x being true, dx is
the belief mass in support of x being false, ux is the amount of uncommitted belief
mass, and ax is the a priori probability, also called the base rate, in the absence
of committed belief mass. Further, these components must satisfy bx+dx+ux = 1
and bx, dx, ux, ax ∈ [0, 1].
A subjective opinion with ux = 0 is called a dogmatic opinion, and cor-
responds to the classic probability distribution. A dogmatic belief for which
bx(x) = 1, for some x ∈ X, is called an absolute opinion. An opinion with ux = 1
is called a vacuous opinion. For a given binomial opinion ωX , the corresponding
projected probability distribution P(x) : x→ [0, 1] is determined as
P(x) = bx + ax · ux (1)
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where P(x) represents the probability estimation of x which varies from the base
rate value, in the case of complete ignorance (ux = 1), to the actual probability
in case that ux = 0.
Subjective Logic provides a standard set of logical operators. In this paper
we need to deal with only three operators. These are the conjunction (also called
multiplication), disjunction (also called co-multiplication), and addition opera-
tors.
Definition 3. (Conjunction Operator) Given two opinions ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉
and ωy = 〈by, dy, uy, ay〉 where x and y belong to independent frames of discern-
ment, we compute the conjunction of the two opinions, ωx∧y, as
bx∧y = bxby +
(1− ax)aybxuy + ax(1− ay)uxby
1− axay
,
dx∧y = dx + dy − dxdy,
ux∧y = uxuy +




By using the symbol (·) to denote this operator, multiplication of opinions
can be written as ωx∧y = ωx · ωy.
Definition 4. (Disjunction Operator) Given two opinions ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉
and ωy = 〈by, dy, uy, ay〉 where x and y belong to independent frames of discern-
ment, we compute the disjunction of the two opinions, ωx∨y, as
bx∨y = bx + by − bxby,
dx∨y = dxdy +
ax(1− ay)dxuy + (1− ax)ayuxdy
aX + ay − axay
,
ux∨y = uxuy +
aydxuy + axuxdy
ax + ay − axay
,
ax∨y = ax + ay − axay.
By using the symbol (t) to denote this operator, co-multiplication of opinions
can be written as ωx∨y = ωx t ωy.
Definition 5. (Addition Operator) Given two opinions ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉 and
ωy = 〈by, dy, uy, ay〉 where x and y be two disjoint subsets of the same frame X,
i.e., x ∩ y = ∅, we compute the addition of the two opinions, ωx∩y, as
bx∩y = bx + by,
dx∩y =







ax∩y = ax + ay.
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By using the symbol (+) to denote this operator, addition of opinions can
be written as ωx∩y = ωx + ωy.
4 Subjective Attack Trees
In this section, we discuss our approach to model security risk scenarios under
second-order uncertainty, using Subjective Attack Trees (SATs).
In SATs, the tree structure is not different from the one in traditional ATs
in that it also allows for the decomposition of the main goal of an attacker into
sub-goals either conjunctively or disjunctively, except that the input parameters
represent subjective opinions rather than probabilities.
Fig 2 shows an example SAT with three possible paths (ways) an attacker can
choose to achieve their main goal (MG). These paths begin by the execution of
the following security events: (SE1 and SE2), SE3, and (SE4 and SE5). Taking
the first path with security events SE1 and SE2 as an example, the subjective
opinions on them, respectively, are denoted by ωSE1 and ωSE2 . The subjective
opinion on sub-goal 1 (ωSG1) is computed from the conjunction of ωSE1 and
ωSE2 , and the subjective opinion on the main goal (ωMG) is computed from
the disjunction of ωSG1 and ωSG2 . The subjective opinion on MG represents
the belief that an attacker can successfully achieve their main goal, the disbelief
that an attacker can successfully achieve their main goal, and the uncertainty
degree about the distribution of these belief and disbelief values.
Fig. 2: A Subjective Attack Tree (SAT) model uses subjective opinions as input
parameters to capture uncertainty degrees about the events’ likelihoods. Here,
ωi is a subjective opinion capturing aspects of the likelihood of event i.
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5 Security Events Evaluation using Subjective Logic
In this section, we propose an approach to derive subjective opinions about
security events, using the evaluation and two criteria proposed in [1]. In our
approach, uncertainty about likelihoods of security events (as discussed in the
introduction) is due to uncertainty about the evaluation of the two criteria.
We first need to consider quantitative values describing likelihood levels from
combining technical difficulty levels with the vulnerability levels. An example
of mapping qualitative scales into corresponding quantitative values is shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Corresponding quantitative values to likelihood qualitative scales.
Rating Qualitative scales Quantitative values Description
1 very low [0.1-0.2] highly unlikely to occur
2 low [0.2-0.4] will most likely not occur
3 moderate [0.4-0.6] possible to occur
4 high [0.6-0.8] likely to occur
5 very high [0.8-1.0] highly likely to occur
5.1 The Two Criteria Evaluation
We mentioned in the introduction that it is often difficult to precisely deter-
mine the level of a vulnerability or technical difficulty of an attack. We propose
a novel way to model uncertainty about the evaluation of these two criteria,
allowing one to derive subjective opinions about security events, used then as
input parameters in SATs.
Since each criterion specifies a number of categories (i.e., levels), where only
one category represents the truth value in a given case, these categories thus
represent the state space of a given criterion, and accordingly, the two criteria
can be thought of as two frames of discernment. The state space of a vulner-
ability level is V L = {e,m, h}, and the state space of the technical difficulty
is TD = {t,m, d, vd}. In our approach, security analysts need to assign values
from the interval [0, 1] to each category, denoting their degrees of belief that each
category represents the truth value. In addition, they complement these degrees
by an uncertainty mass, provided that the sum of all the beliefs and uncertainty
mass must equal to one. Furthermore, they assign a base rate to each category,
as prior probability in absence of evidence, where the sum of the base rates must
equal to one. Unless specified otherwise, we assume a uniform distribution for
the base rates— the base rate of each category in the vulnerability level’s frame
of discernment is given as 1/3 (≈ 0.33), and as 1/4 (= 0.25) in the technical dif-
ficulty’s frame of discernment. Fig 3 shows three examples of belief assignments
in a vulnerability level’s frame of discernment given different uncertainty masses
about beliefs distribution.
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be bm bh uV L
0 0 1 0
(a)
be bm bh uV L
0 0 0.8 0.2
(b)
be bm bh uV L
0 0 0 1
(c)
Fig. 3: Examples of belief assignments in a vulnerability level’s frame of discern-
ment: (a) the vulnerability level is ’high’ with 100% confidence (i.e., 0 uncer-
tainty), (b) the vulnerability level is ’high’ with 0.2 uncertainty, and (c) complete
uncertainty about the vulnerability level. uV L stands for the uncertainty mass
in the frame of discernment.
5.2 Evaluation Rules for Security Events
Because of uncertainty about the values of the two criteria, computing final opin-
ions about security events directly using an evaluation matrix such as of Fig 1
is too complex. This requires to do multiplication of each likelihood level with
the values of the corresponding combination of a Vulnerability level and techni-
cal difficulty, meaning that we need to perform twelve calculations. To facilitate
the computation of subjective opinions, we propose a simple specification that
translates the matrix in Fig 1 into a form of rules, calling them evaluation rules.
The specification compacts the matrix information using a simple syntax such
as
(V L = valueV L) ∧ (TD = valueTD)⇒W SE, (2)
where V L = valueV L denotes the level of a vulnerability, TD = valueTD denotes
the technical difficulty of an attack, SE denotes security events for evaluation,
and ∧ is the conjunction symbol (i.e., AND). V L = valueV L and AD = valueTD
are called the antecedents of the rule, while SE is the consequent. Further, the
rule is given some form of weight, represented by W above the implication
symbol ⇒, denoting the likelihood level of SE occurrence given the values of
the antecedents. The rule’s weight corresponds to a cell value in a matrix. For
example, the evaluation of a security event given that the vulnerability level is
easy E and technical difficulty is difficult D according to the matrix in Fig 1 can
be formulated as (assuming that the quantitative value corresponding to rating
3 is 0.5):
(V L = easy) ∧ (TD = difficult)⇒0.5 SE
When the same evaluation (i.e., the same unique likelihood level) is given for
more than one combination, we use the union operator (∪) as follows
(V L = valueV L ∧ TD = valueTD)comb1
∪ (V L = valueV L ∧ TD = valueTD)comb2
∪ · · · ∪ (V L = valueV L ∧ TD = valueTD)combn ⇒W SE,
(3)
where comb1 denotes the first combination of vulnerability level and techni-
cal difficulty, comb2 denotes the second combination, and so on, and comb1 6=
comb2 6= . . . 6= combn.
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This rule can be further simplified. We may use the relation symbols of ≤
and ≥ to express a group of consecutive cells whose combinations are less than
or equal (or greater than or equal) a certain level of vulnerability, technical
difficulty, or both of them (with the assumption that there is a total order on
the values of the two criteria). For example, the combinations of (hard H, trivial
T ) and (hard H, moderate M ) in Fig 1 can be expressed as (V L = hard)∧(TD ≤
moderate). TD ≤ moderate in this example means that the technical difficulty’s
values are moderate and trivial. Accordingly, the evaluation rule is written as
(with 0.3 corresponds to rating 2):
(V L ≤ medium) ∧ (TD ≤ moderate)⇒0.3 SE. (4)
As in Eq 3, the union symbol ∪ can be also used to link antecedents that
involve the relation symbols ≤ and ≥ in their expressions. For example, in
Fig 1, since the rating 4 (0.7 in our quantitative example) is given for (V L ≤
medium ∧ TD = trivial) and for (V L = easy ∧AD = moderate), we formulate
the evaluation’s rule as
(V L ≤ medium ∧ TD = trivial) ∪ (V L = easy ∧ TD = moderate)⇒0.7 SE.
Based on the above discussion, we generalise Eq 2, Eq 3, and Eq 4 to obtain
a more general form of security events evaluation as follows
(V L valueV L ∧ TD  valueTD)comb1
∪ (V L valueV L ∧ TD  valueTD)comb2
∪ · · · ∪ (V L valueV L ∧ TD  valueTD)combn ⇒W SE,
(5)
where  is any relation symbol from the set {=, ≤, ≥}, comb1 denotes the first
combination of likelihood level and technical difficulty, comb2 denotes the second
combination, and so on, and comb1 6= comb2 6= . . . 6= combn.
5.3 Computing Final Opinions about Security Events
We use the proposed evaluation rules to derive subjective opinions about se-
curity events. We first need to evaluate each single antecedent in a rule (e.g.,
V L = hard and TD ≥ difficult) using the belief assignments in the frames of
discernment of the two criteria . Next, we evaluate the combined antecedents in
a rule (e.g., (V L = easy ∧ TD ≤ moderate) ∪ (V L = medium ∧ TD = trivial))
using the corresponding operators of ∧ and ∪ in Subjective Logic. The symbol
(∧) is used to link two antecedents of different types to express a combination
of technical difficulty and vulnerability level. The symbol (∪) is used to link
multiple combinations of the same evaluation.
First, each single antecedent is evaluated by deriving a binomial opinion
about it since their states can be either true or false. To derive a binomial opinion
about an antecedent of the form CT = valueCT , where CT ∈ {V L, TD} (i.e.,
the criterion type), and valueCT is a category belongs to a given criterion, the
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Fig. 4: Deriving binomial opinions about two antecedents (a) X : V L = easy,
and (b) Y : V L ≥ medium.
belief mass of the binomial opinion takes exactly the same belief mass associated
to the category valueCT in the frame of discernment, and the disbelief mass of
the binomial opinion is equal to the sum of all beliefs assigned to the other
categories. The uncertainty of the subjective opinion takes the same uncertainty
mass associated to the whole frame of discernment. Further, the base rate of
the binomial opinion is exactly the same base rate associated to that category.
Fig 4 shows an example beliefs and base rates assignments in a VL’s frame of
discernment. Suppose we want to derive a subjective opinion about V L = easy,
this process is demonstrated in Fig 4 (a).
To derive a binomial opinion about an antecedent of the form CT valueCT ,
where  ∈ {≤,≥}, the belief mass of the binomial subjective opinion is the sum
of all beliefs assigned to the categories starting from valueCT and higher than this
category in case of  = {≥}, or the sum of all beliefs assigned to the categories
starting from valueCT and lower than this category in case of  = {≤}. The
disbelief mass of the binomial opinion takes the sum of all beliefs assigned to the
remaining categories. The uncertainty of the binomial opinion takes exactly the
same uncertainty mass associated to the whole frame of discernment. Further,
the base rate of the binomial opinion is the sum of all base rates assigned to
the categories starting from valueCT and higher than this category in case of
 = {≥}, or the sum of all base rates assigned to the categories starting from
valueCT and lower than this category in case of  = {≤}. Fig 4 (b) demonstrates
the process of deriving a binomial opinion about V L ≥ medium.
As a next step, we derive a binomial opinion about the antecedents. In Sub-
jective Logic, the symbol ∧ corresponds to the multiplication (conjunction) op-
erator, and the symbol ∪ corresponds to the addition operator. Following this,
we derive a final opinion about a security event. This is achieved by multiplying
the obtained subjective opinion about the antecedents with the rule’s weight.
Because of uncertainty about the two criteria values, different evaluations (i.e.,
different subjective opinions) are obtained for security events, and the number
of evaluations is equal to the number of rules.
Let ri be an evaluation rule, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and n is the number of
evaluation rules, and the rule’s strength is denoted by Wri . Let also SE be a
security event for evaluation. According to Eq 5 and the operators of conjunction
(·) and addition (+), the subjective opinion on the security event SE is computed
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Fig. 5: The security actions and associated vulnerabilities (ovals) in Example 1.
from rule ri as follows
ωSEi =((ωV LvalueV L .ωTDvalueTD )comb1
+ (ωV LvalueV L .ωTDvalueTD )comb2
+ · · ·+ (ωV LvalueV L .ωTDvalueTD )combn).Wri .
(6)
To perform multiplication of a subjective opinion (about the antecedents)
with a single value (the rule weight), we multiply each of the belief mass and base
rate of the subjective opinion with the rule weight while maintaining the same
uncertainty degree. This process ensures that the projected probability of the
resulting subjective opinion (about a security event) is the same as if we multiply
the projected probability of the subjective opinion about the antecedents with
the rule weight. Formally, assuming ωx = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉 is the subjective opinion
about antecedents in a rule of wight y (W = y), then a subjective opinion about
a security event SE is computed as ωx = 〈bx.y, dx, ux, ax.y〉.
Finally, because of different possible outcomes obtained for a security event,
we choose only one outcome to represent an input parameter in a SAT. In this
paper, we work under the most expected risk scenario, by choosing the outcome
that represents the most expected likelihood for a security event. For this pur-
pose, we use the projected probability function (see Eq 1), which provides an
estimate for the ground truth value of a variable by capturing the most likely
value in presence of base rates.
Example 1. Suppose that in order to disrupt a communication network, the at-
tacker needs to perform any of the following security actions: installing a key
logger, attacking the transport layer, or running a DoS attack, via exploiting
some existing vulnerabilities as shown in Fig 5. Suppose also the evaluation of
security events is expressed by the following three rules:
r1 : (V L ≤ medium ∧ TD ≤ moderate)⇒0.8 SE
r2 : (V L = easy ∧ TD ≥ difficult) ∪ (V L = hard ∧ TD ≤ moderate)⇒0.5 SE
r3 : (V L ≥ medium ∧ TD ≥ difficult)⇒0.2 SE
Further, the beliefs assignments to each category in the frames of discernment
of the level of each vulnerability and technical difficulty of each security event
Modelling Security Risk Scenarios Using Subjective Attack Trees 13
is given in Table 2. By deriving binomial opinions about the antecedents of
the three rules, and using Eq 6 to compute subjective opinions about the secu-
rity events, we obtain three possible subjective opinions for each security event
(see Table 3). Having computed the projected probability of these subjective
opinions to obtain the most expected value of each security event, we conclude
that ωSE1 = 〈0.618, 0.252, 0.130, 0.264〉, ωSE2 = 〈0.142, 0.569, 0.289, 0.660〉, and
ωSE3 = 〈0.567, 0.287, 0.146, 0.264〉, and these would represent input parameters
in Fig 5.
Table 2: Beliefs assignments in the frames of discernment of (a) the level of each
vulnerability and (b) technical difficulty of each attack in Example 1.
(a)
Vulnerability be bm bh uV L
V1 0.15 0.60 0.05 0.20
V1 0.00 0.15 0.70 0.15
V2 0.30 0.50 0.10 0.10
(b)
Event bt bm bd bvd uTD
SE1 0.85 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.05
SE1 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.05 0.30
SE2 0.20 0.60 0.05 0.00 0.15
Table 3: The possible subjective opinions about security events in Example 1.
Security event Possible subjective opinions Rule of derivation
〈0.618, 0.252, 0.130, 0.264〉 r1
〈0.047, 0.863, 0.090, 0.165〉 r2SE1
〈0.009, 0.952, 0.039, 0.660〉 r3
〈0.009, 0.912, 0.079, 0.264〉 r1
〈0.053, 0.797, 0.150, 0.165〉 r2SE2
〈0.142, 0.569, 0.289, 0.660〉 r3
〈0.567, 0.287, 0.146, 0.264〉 r1
〈0.068, 0.865, 0.067, 0.165〉 r2SE3
〈0.011, 0.904, 0.085, 0.660〉 r3
6 Propagation of Subjective Opinions in SATs
So far, we have discussed the model of SAT and how to derive subjective opinions
about security events as input parameters in the model. In this section, we discuss
how these subjective opinions are propagated (through the gates of AND and
OR) such that a subjective opinion on the root node can be then obtained.
Subjective opinions are propagated through AND gate using the conjunction
operator. Let Z be an AND node in a SAT, with X and Y are its children. Let
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also ωX = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉 and ωy = 〈by, dy, uy, ay〉 be the subjective opinions
on X and Y , respectively. The subjective opinion on Z, ωZ , is computed as
ωZ = ωx · ωy. Fig 6 (a) shows an example computation of a subjective opinion
on event Z via AND gate.
Subjective opinions are propagated through OR gate using the disjunction
operator. Let Z be an OR node in a SAT, with X and Y are its children. Let
also ωX = 〈bx, dx, ux, ax〉 and ωy = 〈by, dy, uy, ay〉 be the subjective opinions
on X and Y , respectively. The subjective opinion on Z, ωZ , is computed as
ωZ = ωx t ωy. Fig 6 (b) shows an example computation of a subjective opinion
on event Z via OR gate.
The operators of conjunction and disjunction on subjective opinions proved
to be commutative and associative [9], and therefore the order of nodes (both
AND and OR nodes) in an AT is not important.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Computing an opinion on event Z via (a) AND gate, and (b) OR gate.
7 Experimental Evaluation
We conduct an experimental evaluation to compare our approach with tradi-
tional probabilistic ATs, using the Stuxnet attack tree [1] as an illustrative
example. To make the example simple, we consider only the operation of self-
installation as demonstrated in Fig 7. Also, we omit the modelling of the vul-
nerability information about the security events, assuming their evaluations are
obtained according to the two criteria and methodology we proposed in this pa-
per, since the main goal of the section is to demonstrate why uncertainty should
be taken into account when conducting risk analysis using models such as ATs.
We conduct three experiments, in each of which, we work with a different set
of probabilities to compute the likelihood of the attack. We then start producing
uncertainty about these probabilities. Uncertainty about a probability distribu-
tion is produced such that it affects a support to its belief mass only, a support
to its disbelief mass only, or a support to both its belief and disbelief masses.
For a better study of the impact of uncertainty about the probabilities on
the outcomes, we produce different degrees of uncertainty at each time of eval-
uation. We choose that, at each time, uncertainty about the probabilities is
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Fig. 7: Attack tree of “Stuxnet self-installation”.
increased by at most %25, and for one time we consider the situation of com-
plete uncertainty about the security events’ probabilities. Here, we consider the
following uncertainty categories: (1) uX ∈ [0.01, 0.25], (2) uX ∈ [0.26, 0.50], (3)
uX ∈ [0.51, 0.75], (4) uX ∈ [0.76, 1.0], and (5) uX = 1.0, where X is any security
event in the given AT. Due to space limitation in this paper, we show only the set
of probabilities and subjective opinions used in Experiment 1 (see Table 4). The
set of probabilities used in the other two experiments are as follows: 0.3, 0.8, 0.6,
0.7, and 0.5 (for experiment 2), and 0.6, 0.9, 0.6, 0.1, and 0.1 (for experiment 3)
for the security events SE1, SE2, SE3, SE4, and SE5 in order. Uncertainty
about these probabilities is produced in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Table 4: Probabilities and subjective opinions used in Experiment 1.
Uncertainty SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5
ux = 0 0.7 0.86 0.6 0.8 0.9
ux ∈ [0.01, 0.25] 〈0.60, 0.25, 0.15〉 〈0.65, 0.10, 0.25〉 〈0.40, 0.40, 0.20〉 〈0.65, 0.25, 0.10〉 〈0.70, 0.08, 0.22〉
ux ∈ [0.26, 0.50] 〈0.50, 0.20, 0.30〉 〈0.55, 0.10, 0.35〉 〈0.30, 0.25, 0.45〉 〈0.30, 0.20, 0.50〉 〈0.60, 0.00, 0.40〉
ux ∈ [0.51, 0.75] 〈0.25, 0.05, 0.70〉 〈0.35, 0.10, 0.55〉 〈0.17, 0.20, 0.63〉 〈0.15, 0.10, 0.75〉 〈0.34, 0.00, 0.66〉
ux ∈ [0.76, 1.00] 〈0.20, 0.00, 0.80〉 〈0.10, 0.05, 0.85〉 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉 〈0.05, 0.00, 0.95〉 〈0.01, 0.00, 0.99〉
ux = 1 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉 〈0.00, 0.00, 0.10〉
In addition to the given AT structure of self-installation, we repeat the same
above experiments for a modified structure in which AND gates are replaced with
OR gates, and vice versa, the OR gates are replaced with AND gates (although
this doesn’t offer a real representation of the self-installation scenario, but we
do so for demonstration purposes only, and therefore should not be taken as a
real representation of the attack). We do swap between the gates in order to also
study the outcomes in case that the target node of evaluation is of type OR.
Using the prorogation method of probabilities (discussed in literature) and
propagation method of subjective opinions (discussed in this paper), we obtained
probabilities for the self-installation attack and subjective opinions on it. To com-
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Fig. 8: Likelihood of self-installation attack in the three experiments using AT
(denoted by uncertainty category with label 0), and SAT models (denoted by
uncertainty categories with labels 1 to 5 as defined in text).
pare the outcomes (likelihoods) from using both approaches, we assumed here
the most expected scenarios when dealing with subjective opinions by comput-
ing their projected probabilities. Fig 8 shows the likelihoods of self-installation
attack in each experiment when there is no uncertainty about the probabilities
(AT model) and when there is uncertainty about them (SAT model) based on
the five defined uncertainty categories (numbered from 1 to 5), and with different
gate type of the root node.
In Experiment 1, and in case of AND gate of the root node, the likelihood of
self-installation attack decreases as uncertainty about the probabilities increases,
and the decrease is to somewhat sharp in case of total uncertainty about the
probabilities, resulting in a reduction from 0.605 to 0.15625 (i.e., the difference
in probability is approximately 0.448). Unlike the case of AND gate, the pro-
jected probabilities of the subjective opinions given that the root node is of type
OR decease very slightly as uncertainty increases, and the difference in the prob-
ability when there is no uncertainty and when there is total uncertainty about
the probabilities is only 0.147. Here, the effect of uncertainty about probabilities
in this particular case is very small. Graph (a) of Fig 8 demonstrates that taking
uncertainty about the probabilities into account when the root node is of type
AND leads to very different results than in case of OR gate.
In Experiment 2, whether the root node is of type AND or OR, the results are
not considerably different in case of AT or SAT model. The maximum difference
in probability using both structures when there is no uncertainty about the
probabilities and when working with total uncertainty about them is only 0.084.
In Experiment 3, both structures result in an increase in the likelihood of the
attack as uncertainty increases. However, the increase is very high in case of OR
gate, nearly 0.42 as probability difference when using the probabilistic approach
and when uX = 1.0, while it is slight in case of AND gate (only 0.159). The
analysis here is opposite to the one in Experiment 1, where both gates lead to
a decrease in the likelihood and such a decrease is sharper in case of AND gate
than of OR gate.
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Importantly, there are cases such that in the AT approach, the decision is to
not protect the system, while it is the reverse in the SAT model. As an example
with OR structure in Experiment 3, the security manager would only consider
a protection mechanism against the attack if the probability is greater than
0.5. This example, in particular, and the results from Experiment 1, in general,
clearly demonstrate the importance of modelling uncertainty about probabili-
ties when conducting security risk analysis — doing so can lead to completely
different security decisions being made.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We developed a new model of attack trees, called a subjective attack tree, that
takes second-order uncertainty about input parameters into account, via subjec-
tive opinions. We proposed an approach to derive subjective opinions security
events based on two criteria, a vulnerability level and technical difficulty of an
attack. Our approach involved development of evaluation rules using subjec-
tive logic. Propagation of subjective opinions has been also discussed. Finally,
we evaluated our approach against traditional ATs, showing that SATs lead to
different outcomes in contrast to ATs, leading to different decisions being made.
As future work, we will consider other criteria to evaluate likelihoods of
security events, such as connectivity of systems, technology and communication
protocols used, users’ behaviour, etc. Further, the current work has presented the
foundation of SATs with only one input parameter, i.e., likelihood. For effective
risk and decision analysis, we will need to extend the model by incorporating
countermeasures, allowing for additional parameters to be included, such as cost
of attack, cost of countermeasure, impact, and so on. We will discuss the impact
of uncertainty in selecting the optimal set of countermeasures, comparing the
results with existing approaches, e.g., [6, 11, 18, 20].
References
1. Abdo, H.: Dealing with uncertainty in risk analysis: combining safety and security.
Ph.D. thesis (2017)
2. Buldas, A., Gadyatskaya, O., Lenin, A., Mauw, S., Trujillo-Rasua, R.: Attribute
evaluation on attack trees with incomplete information. Computers & Security 88,
101630 (2020)
3. Buldas, A., Laud, P., Priisalu, J., Saarepera, M., Willemson, J.: Rational choice
of security measures via multi-parameter attack trees. In: International Workshop
on Critical Information Infrastructures Security. pp. 235–248. Springer (2006)
4. Buoni, A., Fedrizzi, M., Mezei, J.: A delphi-based approach to fraud detection
using attack trees and fuzzy numbers. In: Proceeding of the IASK International
Conferences. pp. 21–28 (2010)
5. Edge, K., Raines, R., Grimaila, M., Baldwin, R., Bennington, R., Reuter, C.: The
use of attack and protection trees to analyze security for an online banking sys-
tem. In: 2007 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS’07). pp. 144b–144b. IEEE (2007)
18 N. Al-Hadhrami et al.
6. Edge, K.S., Dalton, G.C., Raines, R.A., Mills, R.F.: Using attack and protection
trees to analyze threats and defenses to homeland security. In: MILCOM 2006-2006
IEEE Military Communications conference. pp. 1–7. IEEE (2006)
7. Gordon, J., Shortliffe, E.H.: The dempster-shafer theory of evidence. Rule-Based
Expert Systems: The MYCIN Experiments of the Stanford Heuristic Programming
Project 3, 832–838 (1984)
8. Gribaudo, M., Iacono, M., Marrone, S.: Exploiting bayesian networks for the anal-
ysis of combined attack trees (2015)
9. Jøsang, A.: Subjective logic. Springer (2016)
10. Jürgenson, A., Willemson, J.: Processing multi-parameter attacktrees with esti-
mated parameter values. In: International Workshop on Security. pp. 308–319.
Springer (2007)
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